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Abstract
This paper studies how the subsidy support, e.g. price support and reimbursed investment cost
support, affects the investment decision of a monopoly firm under uncertainty and analyzes the impli-
cations for social welfare. The analytical results show that the unconditional, i.e., subsidy support that
is introduced from the beginning, makes the firm invest earlier. Under a linear demand structure, the
unconditional subsidy cannot align the firm’s investment decision to the social optimal one. However,
a conditional subsidy, i.e., subsidy support introduced at the social optimal investment threshold, can
align the two decisions. For a non-linear demand structure, it is possible for the unconditional subsidy
to make the firm invest according to the social optimum. When the investment decisions are aligned,
the firm’s investment leads to the first-best outcome.
Keywords: Investment under Uncertainty, Capacity Choice, Welfare Analysis, Linear Demand, Non-
linear Demand
JEL classification: D81, L51
1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, many public owned functions and businesses have been decentralized, e.g. postal services,
banking, airlines, telecommunication, and public infrastructures. The government owns many resources
such as water, land, and mineral. Decentralization means the private firms have the right to invest, produce,
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and make profit from such resources, for example, port investment, agriculture investment, green energy
investment, and so on. The privatization is believed to be more efficient and effective in decision making
because of the quicker reaction to unanticipated market changes. However, after the privatization, firms
prioritize profit maximization and do not consider the social optimal goals when making decisions. This
is different from the goal of the social planner, which is to achieve social optimality. For instance, energy
producers that use fossil fuel and emit greenhouse gases do not take into account environmental damage
(Eichner and Runkel, 2014), whereas the regulator such as the E.U. parliament, has the purpose to fulfill the
emissions reduction commitment and encourage the investments of renewable energy. In risky environments it
has been argued that a firm tends to postpone investment (see e.g., McDonald and Siegel (1986)). According
to Dobbs (2004), the level of investment in capacity might also be constrained by the firm. For example, an
electricity producer might hesitate to invest in renewable technology due to high investment costs compared
to the fossil fuels. This implies that the energy market has less incentive to deliver the desired level of
renewable investment. This difference in objectives and investment strategies between the profit and welfare
maximizers poses a coordination problem and requires governmental regulation (Rodrik, 1992).
In a market with uncertain future demand, the firm is constantly forecasting demand and balancing the
value of investing now and delaying investments. Thus, the real options approach is used to analyze the
investment decisions. Several literatures have studied to use price regulation such as the price cap to regulate
the delayed investment under uncertainty. For instance, Dobbs (2004) argues that the first-best outcome
cannot be reached as price cap is used for two goals: optimal investment ex-ante and optimal post-investment
pricing. Building on Dobbs (2004), Evans and Guthrie (2012) show that the price cap should be lowered
under scale economics where grouping investments across time is cost efficient. By contrast, Willems and
Zwart (2017) consider constant returns to scale where it is not optimal to group investments. By assuming
asymmetric information on investment costs, Willems and Zwart (2017) study the optimal mechanism where
a revenue tax increases with the level of the price cap. In this paper, we study the policy instrument of
subsidy, rather than price cap.
Subsidy support is a very common policy instrument in the fields of agriculture and green energy. For
agriculture in developing economies, there are input subsidies, which are implemented as price subsidies
accessible to producers according to Chirwa and Dorward (2013). One example is the Indian fertilizer subsidy
in order to encourage the domestic production of fertilizer and to increase its use. To accomplish these two
objectives, India introduced the RPS (Retention Price Subsidy) scheme in 1977, where the difference between
retail price and retention price (adjusted for freight and dealer’s margin) was paid back to the manufactures
as a subsidy (Sharma and Thaker, 2010). Under the RPS, the production cost plus 12% profit is covered
by the subsidy. Later on, RPS was criticized for being inefficient to motivate the producers to decrease
production costs and was replaced by NPS (New Pricing Scheme) in 2003. Under the new system, the
producer receives a set amount based on the age of the production plant and the amount of feedstock used.
In the green energy field, the subsidy support can take many forms such as feed-in premiums, reimbursed
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investment costs, feed-in tariffs, tradable green certificates, and quota obligations. In this research work,
two kinds of price support will be discussed: flexible and fixed price support. Under flexible price support,
the producer receives a payment proportional to the market price for every product sold to the consumer,
like 12% for instance in India’s RPS scheme. Under the fixed price support, the producer receives a fixed
payment for every product sold to the consumer that is independent of the market price, like the subsidy
described in India’s NPS scheme. In the green energy field, the fixed price support may take the form as the
feed-in premium subsidy.
This research studies how different kinds of subsidy support affect the profit maximizing firm’s investment
timing and size, and whether it is possible to align the firm’s investment decisions to the social optimal ones.
Besides the non-linear demand structure used in the price cap literatures, this paper considers also the linear
demand structure. More specifically, we consider two kinds of demand shocks for the linear demand: additive
(Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; Aguerrevere, 2003; Hagspiel et al., 2016) and multiplicative (Grenadier, 2000;
Huisman and Kort, 2015) demand shocks. We show that the subsidy policies introduced from the beginning
make the firm invest earlier and invest less. Moreover, we find that there exists a conditional subsidy to
introduce the subsidy support at the social optimal investment timing to align the firm’s optimal investment
decision to the social optimal one. For the non-linear demand structure, if the demand is iso-elastic as in
Aguerrevere (2009) and Novy-Marx (2007), the influence of the subsidy on the firm’s investment decision
depends on the subsidy rate. It is possible to align the firm’s investment decision to the social optimal
decision if subsidies are introduced from the beginning, or at the social optimal investment timing. For both
demand structures, the subsidies that align firm’s and social optimal investment decision yield the social
optimal surplus. To simplify the analysis, we do not consider the efficiency loss in collecting taxes and the
allocation of taxation as subsidies.
Several research papers have already shed light on investment decisions under policy schemes in the
framework of real options. For the policy scheme that will prevail once being chosen, Pennings (2000)
studies the taxation and investment subsidy to stimulate the instant investment, i.e., the waiting time is
zero. Hassett and Metcalf (1999) consider the uncertainty in the tax policy, such as the U.S. investment
tax credits that have been changed on many occasions since being introduce in 1964, and show that for a
relatively low tax rate, more uncertainty in tax policy speeds up irreversible investment because the firm
inclines to invest at a low tax rate. This paper focuses on the subsidized investment and the corresponding
welfare analysis, rather than on the taxation.
Most of the existing research concerning policy schemes focuses on green investment and takes the subsidy
payments as a volatile process. Up to our best knowledge, those papers only study the investment decisions
from the perspective of the producer and considers mainly the investment timing. For example, Boomsma
et al. (2012) assume that the geometric Brownian motion governs the capital cost, electricity prices, and
subsidy payments. The support schemes considered include feed-in tariff, flexible price premium, and re-
newable energy certificates. The three support schemes differ at how much risk the firm is exposed to the
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market. This is different from our research, where the price volatility is the only risk in the market. Besides
the investment timing, we also consider the influence of subsidies on the firm’s optimal investment capacity.
Moreover, we study the optimal subsidy schemes to make the firm invest in a social optimal way.
Current literatures on subsidy mainly consider the uncertainty about introduction or retraction of subsidy
schemes. Boomsma and Linnerud (2015) also examine how the market risk and the policy risk of retractable
support schemes affect the investment timing. They find that the risk of subsidy termination speeds up the
investment. This result is also supported by Adkins and Paxson (2015). They provide the intuition that the
firm wants to catch the subsidy before it is gone. Similarly, future provision of permanent subsidy delays
investment because the firm wants to wait for the subsidy. This influence of subsidy retraction and provision
is further studied by Chronopoulos et al. (2016). Besides the investment timing, they also consider the
influence of policy uncertainty on the investment capacity/size. They find that the future subsidy retraction
lowers the amount of installed capacity, and the future subsidy provision raises the incentive to install a
larger capacity. In this research, we also consider both investment timing and capacity. Rather than the
policy uncertainty, the focus is on the welfare analysis of the investment subsidy and the optimal subsidy
policies to align the firm’s investment decision to the social optimal investment decision.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the profit and welfare maximizers’ investment
problems and the subsidy support. In Section 3 we derive the optimal subsidy policy to align the firm’s and
social optimal investment decisions, and compare the optimal subsidy support schemes. Section 4 studies
the optimal subsidy policies and compares them for different demand structures. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a continuous-time and one-time irreversible capacity investment problem. Investor needs to decide
on the investment timing and investment capacity. There is no depreciation of capacity and no production
costs and the marginal cost of investment is constant, δ > 0. Once a capacity K is installed, K will be sold
in the market at a price p(X(t),K). {X(t)|t ≥ 0} is the demand shift parameter and satisfies a geometric
Brownian motion,
dX (t) = µX (t) dt+ σX (t) dω (t) , (1)
in which µ is the drift parameter, dω (t) is the increment of a Wiener process, and σ > 0 is the volatility
parameter. The discount rate is r and we assume r > µ. The instant producer surplus is profit flow
p(X(t),K)K. The instant consumer surplus is denoted as cs(X(t),K). A regulator’s objective is to maximize






(p(X(t),K)K + cs(X(t),K)) exp(−rt)dt− δK exp(−rT )
∣∣∣∣∣∣X(0) = X
 . (2)
This yields the social optimal investment decision (X∗W ,K
∗
W ) with X
∗
W the social optimal investment thresh-
old that triggers investing K∗W once it is reached. Hence, the social optimal investment time T is the first
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time that the stochastic process, which starts at X(0) at time zero, reaches X∗W . The profit maximizer, the






p(X(t),K)K exp(−rt)dt− δK exp(−rT )
∣∣∣∣∣∣X(0) = X
 . (3)
The solution gives firm’s optimal investment decision as (X∗,K∗). X∗ is the optimal investment threshold
and triggers the firm to invest K∗ once being reached. Comparing (2) and (3), it can be concluded that firm’s
investment decision is not totally aligned with social optimal investment decision such that X∗ = X∗W and
K∗ = K∗W both hold. This distortion implies that firm’s optimal investment decision generates externality
and does not lead to first-best outcome. In order to align these two investment decisions, the regulator needs
to make the firm internalize this externality when deciding on investment. Because the difference between
the two objectives, (2) and (3), is consumer surplus, a possible regulation is to propose a contract that
specifies a monetary transfer, e.g., a subsidy, to remunerate the firm. Such subsidy scheme can be a subsidy
flow s(X(t),K) that satisfies s(X(t),K) = cs(X(t),K), or a lump sum subsidy transfer s(X,K) to the firm
when investing at level X with capacity K. Let S(X,K) and CS(X,K) be the discounted expected subsidy
and consumer surplus. For both subsidy flow and lump sum subsidy, when firm’s investment decision is





















(4) and (5) are straightforward outcomes from the maximization of social surplus and producer surplus when
the firm internalizes the subsidy. After subsidy, the producer surplus from profit flow is equal to the producer
surplus in (2). The producer surplus from subsidy is equal to subsidy costs. Consumer surplus after subsidy
has the same value as in (2). In this way, social surplus reaches the first-best level after subsidy.
Denote a subsidy flow as s(X(t),K, s̃) for given capacity level K and subsidy rate parameter s̃ ≥ 0. This
flow can be implemented in many forms. It can be a flexible price support (a proportional add-on to the
market price), i.e., s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃P (X(t),K)K, or a fixed price support (a fixed add-on to the market
price), i.e., s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K. These two subsidy flows influence firm’s profit flow directly because of their
relation to market prices. Denote a lump sum subsidy as s(K, s̃). It can be reimbursed investment cost
(a one time remuneration transfer as a fraction of investment costs), i.e., s(K, s̃) = s̃δK. Let the expected
discounted producer surplus be V (X,K, s̃) for the given geometric Brownian motion level X(0) = X and
investment capacity K. The firm’s optimal investment decision is (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)) after subsidy s̃. The
corresponding expected social surplus is W (s̃) = W (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃), s̃). When s̃∗ maximizes W (s̃) and yields
the firm’s optimal decision such that(X∗(s̃∗),K∗(s̃∗)) = (X∗W ,K
∗
W ), then subsidy scheme s̃
∗ is optimal.




Let the inverse linear demand function for a given investment capacity K ≥ 0 be
p(t) =α[X(t)− ηK] + (1− α)[X(t)(1− ηK)]
=X(t)− ηK (α+ (1− α)X(t)) , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, η > 0
This demand function combines two types of demand shocks: additive demand shocks X(t) − ηK and
multiplicative demand shocks X(t)(1−ηK). The additive demand shocks have a weight of α. Besides r > µ,
it is assumed that r > 2µ+σ2 holds as in Chapters 2 and 3. For additive demand structure, the market size
increases when firm waits for a higher demand level to invest. The additive demand structure corresponds
to markets where there is no obvious cap on market size. The multiplicative demand structure is restricted
by market size, and it corresponds to a market where the amount of potential customers is limited. An
example for multiplicative demand structure is the market of agricultural machines, see Boonman (2014),
where the amount of acres of farmlands and the number of farmers are limited. This results in an upper
bound of demand.
For the given linear demand function, this section first explores the first-best outcome, where the social
planner decides about when and how much to invest. This provides a benchmark for the policy regulator to
regulate the monopoly firm. Then the firm’s optimal investment decision (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)) is analyzed under
monetary subsidy. The analysis focuses specifically on the influence of subsidy on the firm’s investment
decision, which provides insights on the efficiency of subsidy regulation. Moreover, this section discusses
the best performance for unconditional subsidy that is implemented from the beginning and for conditional
subsidy that is implemented at some specific demand level.
3.1 First-best benchmark
The social planner’s maximization problem is described by (2). To get a more specific objective function,
we first calculate the discounted consumer and producer surplus separately. For the given level of X(t), the




























For a given X, the consumer surplus increases with investment capacity K. This is because more capacity
yields a lower market price since the firm always produces up to full capacity. For a given amount of
investment capacity K, the consumer surplus increases with X. The reason is that a higher level X implies
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a larger market demand. The highest price that consumers are willing to pay increases. The expected
producer surplus is equal to the value of the firm, which is the discounted profit flow minus the investment











The producer surplus increases with X for given K because a larger demand implies a higher market price











From the discounted social welfare function, we can derive the social optimal investment decision as being
summarized in the following proposition. The proof can be found in Appendix.








(2− (1− α)ηK)− αηK
r
− 2δ = 0 (6)
and


















Next we carry out some further analysis on the social optimal investment decision (X∗W ,K
∗
W ). First,
according to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) it holds that ∂β∂σ < 0 and
∂β
∂µ < 0. From equations (6) and (7), it can
be derived that
∂X∗W
∂β < 0 and
∂K∗W
∂β < 0. Thus, like the standard real options result for firm’s investment
decision by Huisman and Kort (2015), we conclude that the increase of uncertainty, that is, a larger value of
σ, raises both X∗W and K
∗
W . It implies that the social optimal investment is delayed with a greater volatility,
which leads to the adoption of a larger project. This result shows that volatility influences social planner’s
investment decision in the same way as it influences the firm’s investment decision. Moreover, the increase
in drift rate parameter, i.e., a larger value of µ, raises X∗W and K
∗
W as well. The implication is that the
social planner delays and takes on a larger project upon investment when market grows faster. This is due
to the fact that future market demand is taken into consideration when making investment decisions. A
faster growing market yields a higher demand in the future. Thus, more capacity is needed to satisfy such
demand. It delays investment because of the prolonged waiting for a larger market demand to be reached.
3.2 Subsidized Profit Maximization Investment
As mentioned above, we study monopoly firm’s investment decision under subsidy regulation. More specif-
ically, we get the insight of how subsidy influences firm’s optimal investment decision, in order to come
7
up with a subsidy that can achieve either the first-best or the second-best outcome. For the given linear
demand function and subsidy flow scheme s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K, the firm internalizes the subsidy
remuneration into the decision making. Substitute the price in firm’s objective function (3) with subsidized
price (1 + s̃)p(X(t),K). For a given capacity K and X(0) = X, the firm’s value function is equal to












From this value function of the monopoly firm, we can derive the firm’s optimal investment decision and the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Given subsidy flow s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K, the optimal investment threshold X∗(s̃)
and investment capacity K∗(s̃) satisfy the equations
X(K) =
β(r − µ)










2α(1− α)η2K2 + rδ
1 + s̃
(β + 1)(1− α)ηK + α(β − 2)ηK − rδ
1 + s̃
= 0. (10)
First note that when there is no subsidy, e.g., s̃ = 0, we get the monopoly investment decision (X∗(0),K∗(0)).
By comparing with the social optimal investment decision (X∗W ,K
∗
W ), it holds that X
∗(0) = X∗W and
K∗(0) = K∗W /2. This indicates that when there is no subsidy under linear demand, the firm and the
welfare maximizer have the same investment threshold, but the social optimal investment capacity is twice
of the firm’s capacity. This result is consistent with the finding by Huisman and Kort (2015), where linear
demand is considered as well. We then study the influence of subsidy on firm’s optimal investment, which
is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Subsidy flow, s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K, makes the firm invest earlier and less. Uncondi-
tional subsidy cannot align firm’s investment decision to the social optimal investment decision.
Subsidy motivates the firm to invest earlier because monetary transfer increases the firm’s expected value,
which provides an incentive for the firm to enter the market earlier, when market demand is smaller. This
leads to a smaller capacity being invested under subsidy regulation. Because firm’s investment capacity
without subsidy is already only half of the social optimal capacity, subsidy regulations makes firm invest
less than half of the social optimal capacity, and thus deviate from the social optimal decision. So the
unconditional subsidy cannot align profit and welfare maximizer’s investment decisions. Another insight is
that it is difficult to align two decision variables with just one subsidy rate parameter s̃ in unconditional
subsidy regulation. This is because both decision variables, X∗(s̃) and K∗(s̃), are changing with s̃. Intu-
itively, two parameters and a more complicated subsidy regulation scheme will be needed. Next, we check
another subsidy flow with one parameter as well, s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K and s̃ < rδ. This unconditional subsidy
regulation makes the firm invest in the way as described by the following proposition. The firm’s value
function V (X,K, s̃) and the proof of the proposition can be found in the appendix.
8
Proposition 3 Subsidy flow s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K makes the firm invest at threshold X∗(s̃) with capacity
K∗(s̃). X∗(s̃) and K∗(s̃) satisfy
X(K) =
β(r − µ)









2α(1− α)η2K2 + (β + 1)(1− α)(rδ − s̃)ηK + α(β − 2)ηK − (rδ − s̃) = 0.
Similar to the subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K, we have dK∗(s̃)/ds̃ < 0 and dX∗(s̃)/ds̃ < 0, implying subsidy
flow s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K influences firm’s investment decision in the same way and cannot achieve the first
best if it is unconditional, i.e., implemented at Brownian motion level X(0) < X∗. For the lump sum subsidy
transfer, it works the same as s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K as long as its lump sum subsidy rate is s̃/(rδ).
3.3 Second-best outcome for unconditional subsidy
Because unconditional subsidy does not yield the first-best outcome, we want to find out the second-best
outcome that can be achieved by subsidy regulation. Given the firm has invested at threshold X∗(s̃) with
capacity K∗(s̃), the expected social surplus is equal to













Because X∗(s̃) < X∗(0) for s̃ > 0, W (s̃) needs to be compared at a predetermined point in time such



































W (s̃) decreases1 with s̃. s̃∗ = 0 implies that the second-best outcome for unconditional
subsidy is to implement no subsidy.
Figure 1 demonstrates the first-best, second-best outcome and the firm’s optimal investment threshold
X∗(s̃) and investment capacity K∗(s̃). It is shown that without subsidy, i.e., s̃ = 0, the firm invests at the
social optimal threshold X∗(0) = X∗W with half of the social optimal capacity K
∗(0) = K∗W /2. The half
capacity result can be derived by comparing solutions for quadratic equations (7) and (10). For the given
parameter values, K∗(0) = 4.385 and K∗W = 8.770. This is consistent with the findings by Huisman and
Kort (2015). Figure 1a also shows that as s̃ increases, the firm’s optimal investment decision (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃))
deviates further from the first-best outcome. Moreover, the two subsidy flows s̃p(X(t),K)K and s̃K have
similar influence on firm’s investment decision. We can see this from the overlap of the two curves2 for






W (s̃) > 0. This implies an infinite amount of monetary transfer
to the firm.
2We didn’t plot (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)) that generates negative W ∗(s̃).
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(a) Illustration of (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)).

























(b) Illustration of W (s̃) = W (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)).
Figure 1: Illustration of (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)), and W (s̃). Parameter values are α = 0.5, µ = 0.02, r = 0.1,
σ = 0.01, η = 0.05, δ = 10.
(X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)). Besides, the two subsidy flows have the same second-best outcome (X∗(s̃∗),K∗(s̃∗)) as
shown in Figure 1a. This is due to the fact that W (s̃) has the same expression for the two unconditional
subsidy flows. However, the second-best outcome is generated by different subsidy rates as illustrated by
Figure 1b. The subsidy rate is s̃∗ = 0.113 for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and s̃∗ = 0.102 for flow s̃K. Figure
1b also illustrates the discounted total surplus generated by the firm’s optimal investment decision. Under
unconditional subsidy, the social surplus generated by the firm’s investment decision is always below the
social optimal surplus, implying that unconditional subsidy cannot lead to social optimum. Figure 1b shows
that as the subsidy rate goes up, the social surplus first increases and then decreases. Because, the social
surplus W (s̃) consists of producer surplus, consumer surplus and subsidy costs, we further analyze this by
the illustration of Figure 2.
















C(s̃) to a predeter-













For subsidy flow s̃K, the expected subsidy cost is s̃K∗(s̃)/r. Figure 2 shows that the discounted consumer
surplus, producer surplus and subsidy costs increase with unconditional subsidy rate s̃, despite the fact that
s̃ > 0 makes the firm invest earlier and less. It is intuitive that the discounted producer surplus increases
with the subsidy rate. This is because for two subsidy rates s̃1 > s̃2 ≥ 0, the firm can always choose
investment decision (X∗(s̃2),K∗(s̃2)) for subsidy rate s̃1, which would yield a producer surplus that is equal
to PS(X∗(s̃2),K∗(s̃2)) + s̃1p(X∗(s̃2),K∗(s̃2))K∗(s̃2). The fact that the firm chooses investment decision
(X∗(s̃1),K∗(s̃1)) implies it generates larger producer surplus. The consumer surplus also increases with
10



















(a) Subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K.



















(b) Subsidy flow s̃K.
Figure 2: Illustration of CS(s̃), PS(s̃) and C(s̃). Parameter values are α = 0.5, µ = 0.02, r = 0.1, σ = 0.01,
η = 0.05, δ = 10.
s̃ because though the firm’s output decreases with a larger s̃, the firm starts production earlier. So the
consumption also starts earlier, which is preferred by the consumers and yields a larger consumer surplus.
The discounted subsidy cost also increases with s̃. This is intuitive because otherwise the government should
provide an infinite subsidy rate given that both producer and consumer surpluses increase with s̃. When s̃
is small, the subsidy cost grows slower than the sum of producer and consumer surplus. This is illustrated
by an increasing total surplus in Figure 1b. As s̃ increases, the subsidy cost increases faster than the sum of
consumer and producer surplus. This leads to the decrease of total surplus in Figure 1b.
3.4 Optimal conditional subsidy
Though unconditional subsidy does not yield the first-best outcome, it is still possible to align firm’s opti-
mal investment decision to the social optimal decision through a conditional subsidy, that is, the subsidy
implemented at a specific Brownian motion level. This is due to the same investment threshold of the firm
and social planner without subsidy regulation, X∗W = X
∗(0). We take that as one decision variable already
being aligned. Then it is only necessary to align the investment capacities by choosing the subsidy rate
parameter. The optimal conditional subsidy regulation is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The optimal conditional subsidy is to introduce subsidy at the social optimal investment





for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
rX∗W−r(r−µ)δ
r−µ for subsidy flow s̃K,
X∗W−(r−µ)δ
δ(r−µ) for lump sum subsidy s̃K.
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The optimal conditional subsidy described in this proposition aligns firm’s and social planner’s investment
decision, and generates the first-best outcome. Because there is no asymmetry of information on investment
costs, according to Broer and Zwart (2013), a conditional subsidy described in Proposition 4 can be inter-
preted simply as the regulator tells the monopolist when to invest and how much to invest. The changes
in market parameters influence the dynamic optimal subsidy rates, and the influence is summarized in the
following corollary.
Corollary 2 When the volatility rate σ or drift parameter µ increases, the firm needs to be subsidized more
in order to invest at the social optimal capacity level.
This is because an increase in σ or µ makes the social planner invest later and more. In order for the firm
to catch up with the social optimal capacity, either to prepare for positive future demand shocks because of
larger σ or to satisfy a larger anticipated future market demand growth because of larger market trend µ,
more monetary support needs to be transferred to the firm.
4 Non-linear Demand
From previous section, it is now clear that with linear inverse demand function, unconditional subsidy
support does not align firm and social planner’s investment decision. A possible reason might be the linear
demand shocks. In this section, we study nonlinear demand shocks and check the performance of the same
subsidy regulations in previous section. Suppose
p(t) = X(t)K(t)−γ
with 0 < γ < 1, and X(t) follows geometric Brownian motion of (1). Investment costs are of the form3
δ0 + δ1K(t) with δ0 ≥ 0 and δ1 > 0. In the following analysis, we first discuss the first-best outcome and
then check whether unconditional subsidy makes the monopolist deviate or converge to the social optimal
investment. Later we focus on the optimal subsidy regulation policy.
4.1 First-best benchmark
The producer surplus equals to the value of investment, i.e., expected discounted profit flows after investment
minus investment costs. For a given investment capacity K and geometric Brownian motion level X(0) = X,
the producer surplus at X is given by
PS(X,K) = V (X,K) =
XK1−γ
r − µ
− δ0 − δ1K.
3We take a different cost structure than the linear demand because of two reasons. First reason is that the cost structure δK
does not yield any solution for firm’s investment decision under non-linear demand. Second reason is that the cost structure
δ0 + δ1K does not change the main results obtained under linear demand.
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For a given level ofK, the producer surplus increases withX. The reason is that for a given outputK, a larger
X implies larger market demand and higher market prices, which makes the firm more profitable and thus
generates larger producer surplus. Given the firm produces an output of K, the discounted instantaneous






























The insight for consumer surplus is the same as that under linear demand. For a given X, the consumer
surplus increases with K because more output decreases market prices. For a given K, the consumer surplus
increases with X because consumer’s willingness to pay increases. The expected social surplus is the sum of






− δ0 − δ1K.
From the social welfare function, we can derive the social optimal investment decision as the first-best
benchmark. It is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The social optimal investment threshold is





and the social optimal investment capacity is




A further analysis on the influence of market volatility yields similar insight as that under linear market
demand structure. Because ∂β/∂σ < 0, ∂X∗W /∂β < 0, and ∂K
∗
W /∂β < 0, it can be concluded that
∂X∗W /∂σ > 0 and ∂K
∗
W /∂σ > 0, implying a non-linear demand structure like the iso-elastic demand does
not change the standard real option result that a greater volatility delays investment and leads to installing
a larger project.
4.2 Subsidized Profit Maximization Investment
In this subsection, subsidy flows s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K and s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K are considered. The
lump sum subsidy transfer s(K, s̃) = s̃(δ0 + δ1K) is analyzed in more detail than that under the linear
demand structure because of the fixed cost, δ0, from investment. This makes it behave a little differently
from the subsidy flow s̃K. The focus of the analysis is on how subsidy influences firm’s investment decision.
Moreover, it compares the influence of subsidy under non-linear demand with the influence under linear
demand.
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Proposition 6 When subsidy flow is s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K, firm’s optimal investment threshold
X∗(s̃) and investment capacity K∗(s̃) are equal to
X∗(s̃) =
δ1(r − µ)










When subsidy flow is s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K and s̃ < rδ1, firm’s optimal investment threshold X
∗(s̃) and















(δ1 − s̃/r)(βγ − 1)
.
When the lump sum subsidy transfer is s(K, s̃) = s̃(δ0 + δ1K), firm’s optimal investment threshold X
∗(s̃)
and investment capacity K∗(s̃) are equal to
X∗(s̃) =











By comparing (X∗W ,K
∗
W ) with (X
∗(0),K∗(0)), we find that without subsidy regulation, the firm invests
later than the social planner but with the social optimal capacity. This is different from the linear demand
structure, where the firm invests at the same time as the social planner but with half of the social optimal
capacity when s̃ = 0. For unconditional subsidy, Proposition 6 shows that subsidy makes the firm invest
earlier, the same as the linear demand structure. Another insight of the three subsidy regulations is that
subsidy flow s̃K influences the firm’s optimal investment capacity, but subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and lump
sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K) do not. This is different from that under linear demand structure, where all the
three subsidy regulations make firm invest less.
For the unconditional subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0+δ1K), because X
∗(0) > X∗W
and subsidy regulation makes firm invest earlier than trigger X∗(0), it is possible to align firm’s and social
optimal investment threshold by choosing appropriate subsidy rate s̃. This implies that unconditional subsidy
can reach the first-best outcome for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K). Whereas
for subsidy flow s̃K, unconditional subsidy not only makes the firm invest earlier but also makes the firm
invest with a capacity that is larger than the social optimal capacity. This implies that the first-best outcome
cannot be reached for unconditional subsidy flow s̃K. But a conditional subsidy flow s̃K can achieve the
first-best outcome. This is because subsidy motivates the firm to invest earlier than X∗(0), a conditional
subsidy can be implemented such that the firm invests at X∗W with K
∗
W for subsidy flow s̃K. In fact, the
optimal conditional subsidy can be implemented for all the three, the same as under the linear demand
structure. We summarize the optimal unconditional and conditional subsidy regulations in the following
proposition.
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Proposition 7 Unconditional subsidy regulation implemented at X(0) is optimal for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K
and lump sum subsidy transfer s̃(δ0 + δ1K) if the subsidy rate s̃




1−γ for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
γ for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K).
Conditional subsidy regulation implemented at X∗W is optimal if the subsidy rate s̃




1−γ for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
rγδ1 for subsidy flow s̃K,
γ for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K).
With the optimal subsidy regulation, the firm’s investment decision is aligned to the social optimal decision
and leads to the first-best outcome. This result is the same as under the linear demand structure. Recall
from the previous section that for unconditional subsidy, the second-best outcome is to implement no subsidy
at all. In the following analysis, we check whether this is also true for iso-elastic demand structure. Note
that unconditional subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K) can achieve the first-best
outcome. So our focus is on the unconditional subsidy flow s̃K.













(a) Illustration of (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)).























(b) Illustration of W (s̃) = W (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)).
Figure 3: Illustration of (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)), and W ∗(s̃) for subsidy flow s̃K. Parameter values are µ = 0.02,
r = 0.1, σ = 0.01, γ = 0.5, δ0 = 2, δ1 = 10.
Figure 3a demonstrates the firm’s optimal investment capacity K∗(s̃) and optimal investment threshold
X∗(s̃) as functions of subsidy rate s̃. It is clear that when s̃ = 0, K∗(0) = K∗W . As s̃ increases, K
∗(s̃)
deviates from social optimal K∗W , but X
∗(s̃) is getting close to X∗W . Figure 3b shows the total surplus,
discounted to a predetermined time X∗(0), as a function of unconditional subsidy rate. As illustrated, there
exists a subsidy rate that generates the highest level of social welfare for unconditional subsidy. The subsidy
rate that generates the second-best outcome is s̃ = 0.455. As shown in Figure 3b, the total surplus for the
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second-best outcome is below the social optimal welfare that is also discounted to X∗(0). This result is
similar to that under linear demand structure for the unconditional subsidy regulation.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes investment decision of a profit maximizer under subsidy regulation and how to align this
decision to social optimal decision through optimal subsidy. We show that unconditional subsidy introduced
from the beginning accelerates the investment of a monopoly firm. Under linear demand structure, uncondi-
tional subsidy regulation cannot align the profit and welfare maximizers’ investment decisions. Moreover, it
decreases monopolist’s optimal investment capacity and results in smaller social surplus. There is conditional
subsidy regulation that aligns the firm’s investment decision to the social optimal decision. This optimal
conditional subsidy requires to introduce subsidy at the social optimal investment threshold. For non-linear
iso-elastic demand, depending on the form of subsidy regulations, it is possible to implement unconditional
subsidy to align profit maximizing and social optimal investment decisions. The conditional subsidy can also
be implemented in a similar way as under linear demand structure. If we dismiss the efficiency loss when
collecting and allocating the taxation, the aligned profit maximizer’s investment decision can lead to the
first-best outcome for both the linear and non-linear market demand.
Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of the propositions for the linear and iso-elastic demand functions.
Proof of Proposition 1 The social optimal investment capacity KW (X) maximizes W (X,K) and is equal
to
KW (X) =
rX − r(r − µ)δ
η[(r − µ)α+ r(1− α)X]
, (12)
which is equivalent to
X =
(r − µ)(rδ + αηKW (X))
r (1− (1− α)ηKW (X))
.
Let the option value before social planner’s investment be AWX
β . The value matching and smooth pasting
at the social optimal investment threshold X∗W yield
W (X∗W ,KW (X
∗
W )) = AWX
∗β
W ,



















− 2δ = 0. (13)
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Combining (12) and (6), we get the social optimal investment capacity K∗W satisfies the following implicit
equation
α(1− α)η2K2 + rδ(β + 1)(1− α)ηK + α(β − 2)ηK − 2rδ = 0. (14)
Proof of Proposition 2 For X(0) = X, the optimal investment capacity K(X, s̃) maximizes the investment














r(1 + s̃)X − r(r − µ)δ
2η(1 + s̃)[(r − µ)α+ r(1− α)X]
. (15)
Let the option value before investment be AXβ , β > 2 from assumptions in the model of additive demand
function. From the value matching and smooth pasting at the optimal investment threshold X∗, then
V (X∗,K(X∗, s̃), s̃) = AX∗β ,
















Solving (15) and (16) yields that the optimal investment capacity K∗(s̃) satisfies the quadratic form
2α(1− α)η2K2 + rδ
1 + s̃
(β + 1)(1− α)ηK + α(β − 2)ηK − rδ
1 + s̃
= 0. (17)




4α(1− α)η2K∗ + rx(β + 1)(1− α)η + α(β − 2)
)
= r (1− (β + 1)(1− α)ηK∗) .
This implies that dK∗/dx > 0, i.e., dK∗(s̃)/ds̃ < 0. So the subsidy in the market motivates the firm to
invest less. Moreover, from (15), the profit maximizer’s optimal investment threshold is also influenced by

















This yields that dX∗/dx > 0, i.e., dX∗(s̃)/ds̃ < 0. The subsidy also makes the profit maximizer invest
earlier.
Proof of Proposition 3 For a given capacity K and X(0) = X, the value for the expected discounted
profit flow is















The optimal capacity for a given X and s̃ maximizes the value of the firm and is given by
K(X, s̃) =
rX + (r − µ)s̃− r(r − µ)δ
2η [(r − µ)α+ r(1− α)X]
.
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αηK − s̃+ rδ
r [1− ηK(1− α)]
.
Combining K(X, s̃) and X(K, s̃), we get that the optimal investment capacity K∗(s̃) satisfies the implicit
expression
2α(1− α)η2K2 + (β + 1)(1− α)(rδ − s̃)ηK + α(β − 2)ηK − (rδ − s̃) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 For subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and s̃K, the optimal subsidy rate can be derived
by letting KW (XW ) = K(XW , s̃). For lump sum subsidy, the optimal subsidy rate is equal to s̃
∗/(rδ) given
s̃∗ as the optimal subsidy rate for the flow s̃K.
Proof of Corollary 2 Larger σ leads to larger s̃∗ because of ∂X∗W /∂σ > 0 and ∂s̃
∗/∂X∗W > 0. Thus, it
holds that the optimal conditional subsidy rate s̃∗ increases with σ. Next, we check the influence of µ on s̃∗.
Recall from previous analysis that ∂X∗W /∂µ > 0. Then for the three optimal conditional subsidy rates, we




























for lump sum s̃K.
It can be concluded that ∂s̃∗/∂µ > 0.







Let the social planner’s value before investment be AXβ , then according to value matching and smooth


























The corresponding investment capacity is given by




To get the insight of how σ influences X∗W and K
∗
W , we can derive the following first order partial derivatives:
∂X∗W
∂β










= − δ0(1− γ)
δ1(βγ − 1)2
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 6 For a given capacity size K and X(0) = X, the value of the expected discounted








r − δ0 − δ1K for subsidy flow s̃K,
XK1−γ
r−µ − (1− s̃) (δ0 + δ1K) for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K).















for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K).
Substituting K(X) into V (X,K) gives the expected value as a function of X, i.e., V (X). Let the value










for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
r−µ












for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K).
From the optimal investment threshold X∗(s̃), we can get that the optimal investment capacity K∗(s̃) is
equal to
K∗(s̃) ≡ K∗(X∗(s̃)) =

δ0β(1−γ)
δ1(βγ−1) for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
δ0β(1−γ)
(δ1−s̃/r)(βγ−1) for subsidy flow s̃K,
δ0β(1−γ)
δ1(βγ−1) for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K).
Proof of Proposition 7 Given in the text.
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